Evidence review of physical distancing and partition screens to reduce healthcare acquired SARS-CoV-2 by Rooney, CM et al.
ww.sciencedirect.com
Infection Prevention in Practice 3 (2021) 100144Available online at wInfection Prevention in Practice
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate/ ipipReview
Evidence review of physical distancing and partition
screens to reduce healthcare acquired SARS-CoV-2
C.M. Rooney a,b,*, J. McIntyre c, L. Ritchie c, M.H. Wilcox a,b
a Leeds Teaching Hospitals Trust, UK
b Leeds Institute of Medical Research, University of Leeds, UK
c Infection Prevention and Control, NHS England and NHS Improvement, UKA R T I C L E I N F O
Article history:
Received 5 March 2021
Accepted 21 April 2021






SARS-CoV-2* Corresponding author. Address: University
of Medical Research, Leeds, United Kingdom.
E-mail address: christopherrooney@nhs.ne
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.infpip.2021.100144
2590-0889/ª 2021 The Authors. Published by
under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creatS U M M A R Y
We review the evidence base for two newly introduced Infection prevention and control
strategies within UK hospitals. The new standard infection control precaution of 2 metres
physical distancing and the use of partition screens as a means of source control of
infection for SARS-CoV-2. Following review of Ovid-MEDLINE and governmental SAGE
outputs there is limited evidence to support the use of 2 metres physical distancing and
partition screens within healthcare.
ª 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd
on behalf of The Healthcare Infection Society. This is an open access article
under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Introduction
The coronavirus pandemic has undoubtedly posed one of the
greatest challenges to hospital infection prevention and con-
trol (IPC) teams in recent times. Surging hospital admissions
combined with the novel nature of the pathogen required
innovative IPC measures. This provided an opportunity to
question traditional methodologies and investigate the efficacy
of new mitigating measures. We have evaluated the evidence
base for two new IPC measures that have been instigated
within UK hospitals in an attempt to decrease hospital trans-
mission of SARS-CoV-2. A new standard infection control pre-
caution (SICP) of 2 metres physical distancing and the use ofof Leeds, Leeds Institute
t (C.M. Rooney).
Elsevier Ltd on behalf of The
ivecommons.org/licenses/by-partition screens in healthcare, as a means of source control
when single room or isolation facilities are not available.Methods
The results presented reflect the outputs of rapid reviews
created using Ovid MEDLINE, capturing published SARS-COV-2
literature with combined appropriate key word searches,
depending on the topic of interest. The full list of search terms,
inclusive of dates are available in the supplementary materials.
In addition to peer reviewed articles, outputs from gov-
ernmental SAGE (Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies)
meetings were reviewed for references and expert consensus,
where appropriate this has been highlighted within the results
and discussion section. For completion, searches were alsoHealthcare Infection Society. This is an open access article
nc-nd/4.0/).
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identify further resources.Results and discussion
Physical distancing
Given the intimate nature of direct care provision, there is
an understanding that certain aspects of social distancing, for
example working from home, are less applicable to the direct
care environment. Therefore, the term physical distancing has
been used in UK national IPC guidance [1]. The standard
infection control precaution of physical distancing refers
specifically to the actual measurable distance between two
individuals while at work, within the health or other care
environment. Physical distancing refers to the sole act of dis-
tancing oneself from others while at work, and does not
incorporate additional measures, for example, video-
conferencing or standard infection control precautions such as
hand hygiene.
What physical distance should be maintained whilst
working in a healthcare setting
As identified by SAGE, the highest risk of close-range
transmission of SARS-CoV-2 is when someone is in face-to-
face contact with an infected person while indoors [2]. A sys-
tematic search of Ovid MEDLINE from 1996 to September Week
5 2020 yielded 320 papers. Following title, abstract and full
text review a single meta-analysis paper was included in this
review. This meta-analysis of 29 unadjusted and 9 adjusted
observational transmission studies, including SARS-CoV-2,
SARS-CoV (severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus),
and MERS (Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus)
reported that a physical distance of more than 1 metre apart
resulted in a large reduction in viral transmission when com-
pared to direct contact, [adjusted Odds Ratio:0.18 (95% con-
fidence interval 0.09 to 0.38) [3]. Furthermore, the risk of
transmission decreased as distance beyond 1 metre increased,
at 2 metres apart the risk of transmission of coronaviruses
viruses was approximately half, than at 1-metre apart [3].
Although only 7 of the included studies in the meta-analysis
investigated SARS-CoV-2, the association between physical
distance and reduced transmission of viruses was observed
irrespective of causative virus (SARS-CoV-2, SARS-CoV, MERS).
WHO confirmed and probable case definitions were included
within the studies used to create the meta-analysis, there was
no effect modification by case definition identified with phys-
ical distance (Pinteraction ¼ 0.41) [3]. Within the meta-analysis
the included studies investigated different physical distances
(1.0, 1.8, and 2 metres) as the study intervention, the pooled
results taken together by meta-regression, demonstrate the
association between physical distance and risk of infection was
stronger with increasing distance, a 2.02 change in relative risk
per metre (1.08 to 3.76) was estimated [3].
This meta-analysis did not take into account the orientation
of the individuals or the mechanism by which viral transmission
may have occurred (direct contact, droplet, airborne) or the
duration of the exposure. Furthermore, the distances exam-
ined were estimates by the authors, as many of the original
studies included did not state precise distances. The dates of
studies included in the meta-analysis was until May 3rd 2020.However, a search of Ovid MEDLINE from 1996 to September
Week 5 2020 (see supplementary material) did not yield any
further evidence. Despite this, many of the papers included in
the meta-analysis were completed in a healthcare setting and
all were based in an indoor environment and therefore appli-
cable to the health or other care setting.
The meta-analysis reported that increased distance from
the source of infection reduces transmission, which would be in
keeping with droplet spread infections. Acknowledging the
above limitations, the results provide some evidence that a 2
metre distance reduces transmission risk compared to 1 metre.
Evidence of maintaining a 2 metre physical distance in
regard to droplet/airborne transmission
In the literature, airborne infection refers to infection car-
ried by small particles within the air, typically 5mm or less in
diameter, these can also be referred to as droplet nuclei.
Particles greater than 5e10mm in diameter are typically
referred to as respiratory droplets. The term aerosol is used in
some articles to refer specifically to droplet nuclei, while
others will use it to describe a wide range of particle sizes.
Within this document the term aerosol has been used as an
overarching term to describe a wide range of particles of
varying sizes. A systematic search of Ovid MEDLINE
(supplementary materials) yielded 241 papers relating to
droplet/airborne transmission and physical distance. Following
title, abstract and full text review, eight papers were included
in this review [4e11]. Their findings are summarised in Table 1.
None of the included papers were specific to SARS-CoV-2.
Liu et al. observed a substantial decrease in droplet nuclei
exposure within 1e1.5metres distance of an infection source
[8] using thermal manikin simulation. The author hypothesizes
this to be a distance threshold, distinguishing two basic
transmission processes, the short-range mode and the long
range mode of airborne transmission. Within the short range
mode, this included both conventional large droplet trans-
mission and newly defined short range airborne transmission
[8]. This is an important finding, given Kunkel et al. identified
90% of aerosols at 0.5 metres were <1mm in diameter using low
(breathing) and high (coughing) flow rates, therefore a dis-
tance of 1e1.5 metres may significantly reduce exposure.
Interestingly, Lindsley et al. demonstrated the impact of dis-
tance on exposure might be a function of time, where initially a
physical distance of 1.83 metres decreased aerosol exposure
but longer duration of exposure (>30mins) at a distance of 1.83
metres actually increased aerosol inhalation [7]. However, this
was in a simulated environment without mixing airflow, which
would be present in a ward/care environment, and likely
reflects airflow dynamics. Although none of these studies
specifically investigated SARS-CoV-2 virus and there are mul-
tiple limitations to be considered (table 1), they provide some
evidence in addition to that of Chu et al. [3] that at a 2 metre
physical distance, the risk of exposure decreases to an
acceptable level, but is likely time dependant.
The use of partition screens for source control of
infection
Source isolation of confirmed or suspected infected patients
is a well-established infection control practice [12] and has
been demonstrated to significantly decrease nosocomial
spread of disease. Learning lessons from the original SARS1
Table 1
Summary of droplet/airborne transmission with respect to physical distance.
Author Setting Infectious agent Sampling method Distance (M) Result Limitations




N/A 0.35, 1.0, 1.5 Time average exposure mostly
decreases with an increase in
separation distance, this effect
was more prominent in steady
state rather than short term
events.
Tracer gas. Still Manikins, limited
measurements, risk calculation relying
on stable dosing flow rate, short term
events limited to building up from
background concentration.
Bischoff [5] Human participants.
Hospital ward and A&E
Influenza Air sampling
with rRT-PCR
0.30, 0.914, 1.829 Influenza virus was detected in 43%
of known positive patient rooms.
Exposure was mainly small
particles. (diameter, <4.7 mm),
with concentrations decreasing
with increasing distance from the
patient’s head, -p value < 0.05, at
0.30 versus 1.8 metres.
All equipment removed from patients.
Single time point. Assess exposure to
virus rather than transmission. No
asymptomatic individuals included.
Kunkel [6] Simulation room Bacteriophage T4 aerosol sampling,
culture and qPCR
0.5, 3, 5, 7 Particle size distribution between
40-70um. 49% of T4 DNA was
extracted from 0.5um sized
particles at 0.5M and 90% from
<1um. No substantial size
distribution of mass demonstrated
at different locations but there
was a decrease in magnitude of
aerosols with increasing distance.
Surrogate organisms used. Not
healthcare environment.




0.46, 1.83 Increased distance from cough
simulator to breathing simulator
significantly reduced the amount
of inhaled virus (P ¼ 0.009).
Analysis of longer exposure of
30mins duration, increased
distance increased the overall
particle inhalation
Two sizes of aerosol particles used.
Uniform concentration of influenza
within aerosols.









Substantial increase in droplet
nuclei exposure when within 1
e1.5M of infection source.
Exposure not transmission. The 1.5M
threshold does not account for the cough
scenario.





1.0 Following a cough air motion of
0.5m/s is identified at 1m away
Small sample size (12), single distance
measured. Healthy volunteers without
respiratory infection were studied.
Particle size not studied.
Tang [10] Human participants,
simulated exposure
manikins
Influenza RT-PCR 0.1, 0.5 Failed to detect any influenza RNA
landing on, or inhaled by, a life-
like, human manikin target, after
Low PCR CT values in participants (visible
droplets were present on the manikins
after exposure). Experiment did not
capture the entire exhaled breath/































































































































































































































































































































































































































C.M. Rooney et al. / Infection Prevention in Practice 3 (2021) 1001444outbreak, it was noted that full partitions (floor to ceiling, wall
to wall) could be used to increase ante-room/side-room
capacity within hospitals [13]. Seasonal influenza guidance
from the CDC suggests the use of partitions as an engineering
control [14]. Within international guidance on remobilisation of
services and appropriate use of PPE during the SARS-CoV-2
pandemic, the use of transparent glass or plastic screens has
been recommended by the CDC [15] and WHO [16] to prevent
the spread of infection.
Screen composition and placement
Screens or partitions are typically composed of acrylic
(plexiglass) or polycarbonate plastics, which offer greater
malleability and impact resistance with less weight than glass
[17]. The expectation is that the addition of a partition
between bed spaces or out-patient waiting areas will reduce
physical contact between individuals, reduce inhalation of
infective aerosols and reduce deposition of infected aerosols
on mucous membranes or high touch surfaces of adjacent
individuals. Positioning is key to an effective partition, a clear
requirement within industry is the dimensions of the partition
should exceed the breathing zone of both users [17]. The
breathing zone has been defined as a hemisphere of 30 cm
extending forward in front of a patient’s face and measured
from a midpoint between the nose and mouth [18]. Openings in
the partition should be kept to a minimum and not located
within the breathing zone. Furthermore, industry practices
suggest that surface mounted fixation of the partition is pre-
ferred to suspension, which could swing or waft air. While these
recommendations appear logical, there seems to be a dearth of
evidence supporting them.
The use of partition screens in simulated multi-bedded
environments
Five papers examining the role of partitions within health-
care have been included in this review [19e23], and are sum-
marised in Table 2. Within a simulated ward environment,
Noakes et el demonstrated that a physical barrier inserted
between bed spaces could reduce the transmission of infec-
tion. This reduction of infection was based on the alteration of
ventilation patterns and subsequent limitation of air mixing
between different patient zones, thereby reducing cross con-
tamination of airflow. The patient zone containing the outflow
extractor (patient 1) demonstrated significant reduction in
airflow into the adjacent patient (patient 2) zone, therefore
reducing the risk of transmission of infection from patient 1 to
patient 2. However, given the airflow extract remained fixed in
patient zone 1, the risk of spreading infection from patient 2 to
patient 1 remained similar, with and without the partition [19].
Within the same report, different scenarios were simulated
encompassing modification of the ventilation system, com-
parison between these configurations demonstrated the
impact of the bed space partition is secondary to the ven-
tilation layout within the room [19]. King et al. used a uni-
variate linear regression model to predict a halving of pathogen
deposition per surface (r¼ -0.32, p¼ 0.0254) for patient 2
(using a partial partition, when the source of infection is
patient 1) [20]. The reverse of this situation, where patient 2 is
the source of infection shows no significant difference in bio-
aerosol distribution with the addition of a partial partition [20].
Given the position of the air inlet remained static between
experiments, it would seem the presence of the partition again
Table 2
Summary of partition use in multi-bedded bay environments.
Author Setting Partition Infectious agent Sampling method Result
Noakes [19] Two bedded bay Full length vertical partition extending to





Physical barrier inserted between bed spaces
could reduce the transmission of infection, but
this was dependant on the location of outflow
extractor
King [20] Two bedded bay Plastic sheet hung between the patients
bed spaces; gaps of 20 cm were left
above and below the sheet (partial
partition) and 80 cm at the end of the






Univariate linear regression model based on
normalised deposition counts predicted a
halving of pathogen deposition per surface (r¼
-0.32, p¼ 0.0254) for patient 2 (using a partial
partition, when the source of infection is
patient 1)
Ching [21] Two and four
bedded bay
fully extended, bed length (2.1 metre)
and partial bed length (1.2 metre)
curtains
Tracer gas Computational fluid
dynamics
In a two-bedded bay, without curtains, the
concentration of bioaerosols on the adjacent
bed was 11,503 cfu m3; this reduced to 9865 cfu
m3 with partially extended curtains, and to
3782 cfu m3 with fully extended curtains. For
the four-bedded bay configuration, the results
showed a similar trend for both partial and full
extended curtains
Gilkeson [22] Six bedded bay Extended vertically from the floor to 2
feet below the ceiling and horizontally to
beyond the foot of the bed
Tracer gas Pulse injection
technique
The cross ventilated partitioned ward led to a
more heterogeneous tracer distribution
compared with the open ward environment, but
did demonstrate the ability of the partitions to
effectively contain the source of infection
Nielsen [23] Two bedded bay Partial vertical textile partition, 10 cm
opening above the floor, and 40 cm below
the ceiling
Tracer gas Calibrated multi-gas
monitor and
multipoint sampler
In a multitude of ventilation layouts, the
partition was shown not to decrease cross
infection between patients, and may increase


































C.M. Rooney et al. / Infection Prevention in Practice 3 (2021) 1001446played a secondary role in bioaerosol deposition while room
ventilation had the greatest effect. The authors hypothesise
effectiveness of this partition is likely impeded by its curtain
design allowing air flow above and below the partition,
increasing possibility of cross contamination between patients.
In a six bedded bay, Gilkeson et al. demonstrated the ability
of the partitions to effectively contain the source of infection
[22]. However, the results did show that partitions can increase
the risk of transmission of infection in oppositely partitioned
patient zones [22]. Of note, when the source of infection is
located close to an inlet window, within a partitioned bay, this
can lead to increased exposure within the vicinity of the source
and immediately downstream. In circumstances where the risk
of airborne transmission is low, this risk is likely to be negli-
gible. However, in the context SARS-CoV-2, the placement of
partitions relative to suspected/infected patients within a bay
requires careful consideration of ventilation. In contrast,
Nielsen et al. showed partitions to be ineffective at
reducing cross contamination between patients [23].
However, it is worth noting this simulation had a unique ven-
tilation distribution layout, not typical of an average ward
environment [23].
As highlighted, an important aspect in the use of partitions
is ventilation and airflow. The WHO publication on ‘natural
ventilation for infection control in health-care settings’ [24]
stipulates that internal partitions must not restrict intended air
flow paths. However, the above studies by King et al. and
Noakes et al. would suggest changing the airflow is the exact
mechanism by which partitions can reduce the transmission of
infection; however, this needs to be taken in an individual
patient/ventilation context. Morawska et al. has suggested
that when partitions have been used to reduce SARS-CoV-2
transmission secondary measures may be needed to achieve
requisite ventilation [25]. Furthermore, the addition of non-
invasive equipment such as a partition into the clinical set-
ting requires adjustment of the environmental cleaning/
decontamination schedules and a risk assessment to ensure
patient safety (emergency exits) is not compromised.Conclusion
Maintaining physical distancing of 2 metres will minimise the
risk of short-range transmission through droplets. There is
limited evidence that a 2 metres distance is where the risk of
droplet/short-range airborne transmission decreases to an
acceptable level. However, the paucity of convincing reports of
infection transmission beyond this distance suggest it is a
pragmatically reasonable precaution. There is also limited
evidence supporting the use of partitions for face-to-face
interactions or between bed spaces. Studies investigating the
use of partitions demonstrate that ventilation within a room
plays an important role in how efficacious a partition will be.
The main advantage to a partition would likely arise if the
source of infection was next to the air extract, where the
partition, in addition to the ventilation can further reduce
infection spread. Partition decontamination is required and is a
consideration for any engineering or environmental control.
When considering the above interventions, it should be
emphasised that an organisational approach to infection pre-
vention is essential. This framework should encompass struc-
tures for organisational change to support clinical areas tomeet new requirements, and clear IPC leadership to ensure
that multiple interventions are consistently implemented to
reduce virus transmission.
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